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A longitudinal study of the emerging
self from 9 months to the age of
4 years
Susanne Kristen-Antonow*, Beate Sodian, Hannah Perst and Maria Licata
Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany
The aim of this study was to investigate if children’s early responsiveness toward social
partners is developmentally related to their growing concept of self, as reflected in their
mirror self-recognition (MSR) and delayed self-recognition (DSR). Thus, a longitudinal
study assessed infants’ responsiveness (e.g., smiling, gaze) toward social partners during
the still-face (SF) task and a social imitation game and related it to their emerging MSR
and DSR. Thereby, children were tested at regular time points from 9months to 4 years of
age. Results revealed significant predictive relations between children’s responsiveness
toward a social partner in the SF task at 9 months and their MSR at 24 months. Further,
interindividual differences in children’s awareness of and responsiveness toward being
imitated in a social imitation game at 12 months proved to be the strongest predictor
of children’s DSR at 4 years, while some additional variance was explained by MSR at
24months and verbal intelligence. Overall, findings suggest a developmental link between
children’s early awareness of and responsiveness toward the social world and their later
ability to form a concept of self.
Keywords: longitudinal studies, self concept, social cognition, conceptual development, infancy research
Introduction
Self Development: The Importance of Longitudinal Data
The ability to represent oneself as an intentional agent is foundational for the development of
social cognition. Meltzoff (1990) has argued that, from birth, infants are able to recognize others
as “like me.” Based on this fundamental human ability to establish correspondence between oneself
and another agent, infants’ increasing ability to represent themselves as intentional agents leads
to an understanding of others’ intentional action. Evidence for this view comes from a study of
goal-encoding in very young infants which showed that infants as young as 3 months can encode
others’ reaching and grasping actions as goal-directed after having experienced themselves as goal-
directed agents with the help of Velcro mittens (Sommerville et al., 2005). While a representation
of the self as an intentional agent remains implicit in social interactions throughout the first
and second years of life, first evidence for an explicit self-representation emerges close to the
second birthday, when children recognize themselves in the mirror and begin to use self-referential
language. Theories of the developing self (e.g., Damon and Hart, 1982; Meltzoff, 1990; Rochat, 2003)
have emphasized the importance of experience in reciprocal social interaction during the first and
second years of life in leading up to the developmental milestone of mirror self-recognition (MSR).
Furthermore, MSR has been theoretically linked to later Theory of Mind development (Gallup
and Suarez, 1986; Parker et al., 1994). However, to date, there is little evidence for these views,
for lack of longitudinal data. If social responsiveness in specific types of early social interactions
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which provoke self-awareness is developmentally linked to
later explicit self-representation, then individual differences in
these tasks should be correlated independently of more general
cognitive abilities. There is longitudinal evidence for long-term
conceptual continuity in understanding others’ intentional states
from infancy to preschool age (cf. Aschersleben et al., 2008;
Wellman et al., 2008; Thoermer et al., 2012), but no comparable
studies have been conducted with respect to the self. In the
present longitudinal study of self-development, we investigate
the developmental relation of two markers of self-representation,
indexing different levels of self-awareness: The MSR task at
24 months and the delayed self-recognition (DSR) task at 4 years
of age. Note that these classic, yet controversial, tests have been
widely used as markers of the self in empirical studies across
cultures (e.g., Keller et al., 2005; Broesch et al., 2010), in typical
and atypical development (e.g., Povinelli et al., 1996; Lind and
Bowler, 2009), as well as across species (e.g., Povinelli et al., 1993).
Specifically, we explore the predictive relations between precursor
abilities emerging in social interaction in the first and second years
of life and these two markers of self-representation.
Levels of Self-development
The developmental process of self-understanding has been
described as “forward engineering” (Rochat, 2003, p. 117, p.
10), meaning that different constituents of the self develop
chronologically during infancy and early childhood (Damon and
Hart, 1982). This view implies that interindividual differences in
competencies at the different theorized levels are related and that
the self develops as a differentiated, yet conceptually coherent
concept. Rochat described five levels of self-awareness of which
two levels are of central interest, since they pertain to MSR and
DSR, respectively. The first level of interest is the “identification”-
level at which toddlers are able to express an identified self
and comprehend that the mirror reflects their self-experienced
“me,” not some other individual. In other words, at this level the
toddler is able to detect the correspondence between a mental
representation of the self and an observed marked mirror image
and at the same time is able to differentiate between the two. The
second level of interest is the level at which the self can be truly
represented independently of featural information and temporal
contingency. At this level pre-schoolers begin to recognize
themselves in videos and photographs taken in the past as
opposed to live videos or contingent mirror images. It is called the
“permanence”-level. It has been controversially discussed to what
extent toddlers’ MSR and their ability to recognize themselves
in videos index self-awareness or a permanent awareness of
self, respectively. The following paragraph will discuss different
theoretical viewpoints.
Interpretations of MSR and DSR
Classic interpretations see MSR as an evidence of children’s
knowledge about what they look like (Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis
and Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Bischof-Köhler, 1988, 1991), since the
child is required to use a mirror to detect a mark covertly placed
on her or his nose or cheek. In order to do so, the child has to
detect the discrepancy between the mental representation of his
or her own body (e.g., cheek without rouge) and the observed
marked mirror image (e.g., cheek with rouge). Therefore, fitting
with Rochat’s (2003) label, children’smastery of this task at around
18–24 months of age (Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis and Brooks-
Gunn, 1979; Asendorpf and Baudonniére, 1993; Nielsen and
Dissanayake, 2004) has been regarded as evidence for being able
to identify oneself.
This view has been challenged, however. Overall, there are lean
interpretations, rich interpretations and proposals somewhere
between lean and rich. While some theorists (Lewis and Brooks-
Gunn, 1979; Courage and Howe, 2002; Nielsen et al., 2003) state
that mastery of this task proves that children know what they
look like, leaner interpretations have stated that children pass
this test because of kinaesthetic-visual matching skills (Mitchell,
1993; Heyes, 1994). In contrast, richer theories have claimed
that beyond identifying themselves, children’s mark-directed
behavior is evidential of their underlying introspective abilities
and reflective capacities (Gallup, 1998; Gallup et al., 2002). For
instance, Bischof-Köhler (1991) argued that the ability for mental
imagination is necessary for MSR. Mental imagination involves
self-objectification and describes the ability to represent objects,
including the self, independently of the immediate perceptual
reality (see also Moore et al., 2007). In the case of MSR, the
child must be able to couple the “I” (the subject of one’s own
experience) with the objectified and reflected-on “Me.” Thereby,
the “I” can recognize the mirror image as “Me” (Bischof-Köhler,
1991, p.12). Lewis (2003) considers MSR as an indicator of self-
metarepresentation abilities: by recognizing oneself in the mirror,
the mental state of “Me” (as opposed to an implicit knowledge of
the self) is established. The mental state of “Me” in turn gives rise
to mental state attributions to others and awareness of the relation
between self and other (Lewis, 2003). In contrast, in a more
cautious proposal, Perner (1991) argued that self-recognizers
have formed multiple representations of one situation or event,
so called “secondary representations” and thus, understand the
relation between the real situation and the situation in the
mirror. However, MSR does not require a representation of the
representational relation between oneself and the mirror image
of oneself. Similarly, Suddendorf and Butler (2013) argue that
MSR requires the ability to collate representations, rather than a
metarepresentational understanding of the relation between these
representations. Some proposals have been more domain-specific
and state that children’s developing cognitive skills in regard to
analyzing their own face result in mastery of the MSR task (e.g.,
Neisser, 1995). It is argued that it is onlywhen children understand
that their face is important to other people in order to identify
them, they start to use mirrors to see their reflection.
Empirical evidence seems to rule out extremely lean
interpretations of MSR, as well as proposals focusing exclusively
on children’s developing recognition of their own face. For
instance, Nielsen et al. (2006) showed that children can recognize
features of their whole body such as their legs, instead of just
their face, in the mirror. Further, when altering children’s
appearance by putting them in pants, 24-month-olds updated
their representation of what they looked like during an exposure
phase that had just lasted for 30 s. Thus, instead of facing
problems because their proprioceptive matching capacities were
handicapped by wearing pants, they detected the mark more
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rapidly. They only faced problems when they had not been
previously exposed to their altered looks and thus, could not
build an expectation of what they were supposed to look like.
This result supports that children recognize the mark because
of a match between the image in the mirror and their expected
image of themselves (see also Moore, 2007).
While MSR measures a temporally restricted self-
representation, a representation of oneself as a temporally
extended individual seems to develop only around the age of
4 years (e.g., Povinelli et al., 1996). This is what Rochat (2003)
calls the “permanent self ” and what according to Povinelli (1995)
is the “proper self,” characterized by children’s comprehension
of the fact that different temporal representations (past, present,
future) of the self belong to one underlying unifying entity. The
standard task to measure this more elaborate concept of self is
the DSR task (Povinelli et al., 1996). In the DSR task children
have to relate their current self to their temporally-delayed self
as shown on a videotape. Mastery of this task emerges between
3 and 5 years of age (depending on the time-delay between
recording and showing the video to the child; cf. Povinelli,
2001). While replicating the developmental asynchrony between
MSR and DSR, a study by Suddendorf (1999) has challenged
the view that young children have specific problems with self-
awareness. Rather, they seem to have general problems in relating
information shown in a video to the current situation, whether
self-related or not (as in the case of a surprising object in the
room). Similarly, in case of the MSR-task, live video versions lead
to a significant drop in children’s performance below chance level
(Vyt, 2001; Suddendorf et al., 2007). While it remains debatable
if these difficulties merely reflect children’s problems with the
video as a medium itself (Suddendorf, 1999, 2003; Troseth, 2003),
the validity of the DSR task as a measure of self-representation
has been questioned. Within-subject longitudinal data on
different measures of self-awareness can contribute to a better
understanding of this marker.
The Social Origins of Self
The general idea that social experiences in the first year of life
support self-development (e.g., Damon and Hart, 1982; Rochat,
2009) is corroborated by empirical evidence from cross-cultural
studies showing that variations in social experiences impact
children’s performance at the MSR-task. In cultures with a distal
parenting style with a lot of face-to-face contact and object
manipulation (e.g., Greece) children recognize themselves earlier
than in cultures with a stronger emphasis on body contact and
body stimulation (e.g., Cameroon). Cultures (e.g., Costa Rica)
utilizing proximal as well as distal parenting practices fall between
the two other cultural groups in regard to the onset of children’s
MSR (Keller et al., 2004). Further, a parenting style wheremothers
reactmore contingently (e.g., Germanmothers when compared to
Nsomothers inCameroon) has been shown to lead to a higher rate
of MSR (Keller et al., 2005).
Thus, contingency detection in reciprocal social interaction
appears to be onemechanism supporting the development of self-
awareness. Rochat (2009) emphasizes that infants’ engagement
in reciprocal social interaction allows them to use the adult as a
screen providing an opportunity for self-objectification leading to
an emerging sense of shared experience with others. Within these
reciprocal exchanges infants can develop a sense of contingency
and agency as they experience causal efficacy between their own
and the other person’s behavior, as well as bodily reactions. A
frequently investigated phenomenon assessing infants’ sensitivity
to what is reflected back by their interaction partner is the so-
called still-face (SF) effect (Tronick et al., 1978). In reacting with
irritationwhen their interaction partner interrupts the interaction
(frozen face), and by showing different gaze and smile patterns
while trying to bring one’s social partner back into interaction, as
well as by displaying reengagement behaviors such as vocalizing
or bodily movements, children show social responsiveness (see
Mesman et al., 2009, for a meta-analysis of 39 studies employing
the SF task). Individual differences in social responsiveness to
contingency disruption may thus be predictive of the age of
mastery of MSR and DSR.
Another mechanism promoting self-awareness may be
synchronic imitation. Based on infants’ early imitation skills
as a “foundation and earliest manifestation” (Meltzoff, 1990,
p.141) of the self, infants have ample opportunity to detect the
structural equivalence between the acts they perform themselves
and the acts they see others perform in everyday interaction.
A study by Asendorpf and Baudonniére (1993) found that the
extent to which 19-month-old infants engaged in synchronic
imitation as a measure of other-awareness was affected by their
MSR status. Consistently, strong relations were found between
18-month-olds’ MSR skills and their concurrent imitation skills
(Zmyj et al., 2013).This has been interpreted as evidence for a
developmental synchrony between self- and other-awareness
during imitation. However, a study by Nielsen and Dissanayake
(2004) found that while both abilities emerge around the same
age, synchronic imitation skills (Asendorpf et al., 1996) and MSR
proved to be unrelated. The inconsistent findings may be due to
the fact that imitation tasks pose many different cognitive and
motivational demands beyond a basic self and other-awareness. A
clearer measure of self-awareness can be attained in tasks which
tap infants’ awareness of their own actions being mirrored by
another person. Meltzoff (1990) designed a social mirroring task,
in which 9-to 18-month olds’ had to discriminate between an
experimenter mimicking their actions on an identical object and
the object “mimicking” them without being manipulated by an
experimenter, and found clear evidence for an awareness of being
imitated in the majority of the infants above the age of 14 months.
Agnetta and Rochat (2004) did not find significant predictive
correlations between 14-month-olds’ awareness of beingmirrored
and their MSR at 18 months. However, the relation was only
explored at one measurement point, and only with respect to
MSR. If the awareness of being imitated is closely linked to an
understanding of others as intentional agents in infants above the
age of 12 months as Agnetta and Rochat suggest, then individual
differences in this ability may very well be predictive of later DSR
which has been theoretically linked to metarepresentation and
mental state understanding.
Hypotheses
Summing up, based on theories distinguishing between different
levels of self-development in the sense of one underlying
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unitary concept (e.g., Rochat, 2003) we assume MSR-skills to be
related to DSR-skills. Further, based on Rochat’s (2009) social
construction theory and Meltzoff ’s (1990) “like me” hypothesis,
we assume interindividual differences in (a) social responsivity to
contingency disruption, and (b) self-awareness in socialmirroring
to be predictively related to interindividual differences in a time-
restricted concept of self as indexed by MSR-skills, as well as in
a temporally-extended concept of self as indexed by DSR-skills.
We expect these developmental pathways to be specific and thus,
independent of general cognitive abilities.
To test these hypotheses, we studied the predictive relations
between interindividual differences (1) in social responsiveness
in dyadic interaction (SF reaction) at 9 months of age, (2) in social
mirroring assessed at 12months of age, (3) inMSR at 24months of
age and (4) in DSR at 50 months of age, in a longitudinal design.
Interindividual differences based on gender and verbal IQ were
systematically taken into account.
Materials and Measures
Participants
Overall, 89 full-term children (41 female, 48 male) participated in
this comprehensive longitudinal study, while due to attendance
the n at the later measurement points could vary. The mean
age at the first measurement point relevant for this study was
9.00 months (SD = 9 days; n = 88), 12.01 months (SD = 7 days,
n = 89) at the second measurement point and 24.03 months
(SD = 8 days; n = 81) at the third measurement point. At the
fourthmeasurement point, childrenwere, on average, 4.21 years of
age (SD = 0.93 months; n = 70). Children were tested in a child-
friendly research laboratory at the University of Munich and all
came from lower to uppermiddle-class families in anurban area in
the South of Germany. On average, children had one sibling, while
the number of siblings ranged from 0 to 3. The study followed
the ethical standards for experiments involving humans and was
approved of by the University of Munich’s ethics committee.
Still-face Task
The paradigm was adapted from Striano and Stahl (2005) and
involved two interruptive situations (adopting a neutral face
and ignoring the child). The main purpose of this task was to
measure children’s social responsiveness when confronted with
an interruption of communication. Infants were seated on a
highchair facing the experimenter at a distance of about 45 cm.
Once infants were seated, two identical plastic objects (10 cm of
height) were unobtrusively placed to the infant’s left and right side
at a distance of about 70 cm. The procedure always started off and
finished with a normal interaction (NI), while in between the NI
and the two different SF phases were alternated in a randomized
order. The five phases lasted for 30 s each. In the NI phase
children were involved in a natural dyadic interaction. To render
the communication situation as natural as possible, experimenters
were free to react intuitively to children’s social interaction bids
by talking, singing or laughing. In the SF face-to-face condition,
the experimenter adopted a neutral facial expression and looked
at the infant’s face without any affect. During the SF ignore phase,
the experimenter ensured that the infant held eye contact, then
adopted a neutral facial expression and turned to the side of one of
the two objects (the side of the objects was counterbalanced across
children). Thus, the infant was ignored during the whole phase.
No smiling or gazing back at the infant or touching the infant
occurred. Thus, the two SF variants did not differ in the facial
expression (neutral) and were both characterized by the absence
of communicative bids.
Based on the coding scheme by Striano and Stahl (2005),
infants’ behaviors were coded using the INTERACT® software.
Percent duration of time that infants engaged in a particular
behavior was used as dependent measure. The dependent
measures included the amount of smiling (raised cheeks,
upward turned lips), gazes at experimenter and reengagement
behaviors. Reengagement behaviors involved movements (arm or
leg movements or pick-me-up gestures accompanied by looks
directed at the experimenter) and communicating (e.g., babbling,
squeaking, laughing or whining) while gazing at the experimenter.
In order to analyze whether a SF effect was manifested, smiling,
gaze and reengagement behaviors were averaged across the three
NI episodes and then compared to the average duration of smiling,
gaze and reengaging behavior across the two SF episodes.
Note that according to the literature competent children
should, on average, show important differences in their gaze, smile
and behavior when comparing the SF phase with the NI phase.
More specifically, the SF effect involves a decrease in smiling and
gazing behavior, as well as an increase of reengagement behaviors
displayed toward the interaction partner during SF (interrupted)
compared to NI episodes.
Thus, for subsequent correlational analyses, difference scores
were computed for all three behaviors: the duration of each
behavior during NI was subtracted by the duration during
SF phases. Based on these difference scores, the following
competence levels were defined: for smiling and gazing, a subject
was classified as competent (and assigned a competence score of
1) if the difference scores in smiling and gazing behavior between
the averaged NI and SF episodes was greater than zero, that is,
the child spent less time smiling or gazing respectively, during SF
phases than during NI. A child who received a negative value or
a score of zero was classified as incompetent (and was assigned a
competence score of 0). For reengagement behavior the rationale
was different. Note that responsivity to social interaction cues is
characterized by an increase of reengagement behaviors after the
interruption of an ongoing interaction and a decrease of such
behaviors once NI was re-established. Therefore, a competence
score of 1 was assigned if the amount of reengagement behaviors
during the SF phases was greater than during NI. Note that all
scores around 0 and below were assigned a 0. In order to be
assigned a score of 1 instead of 0, the differences between the NI
and the SF effect had to be significantly different from zero.
Consequently, infants were classified as incompetent (and
assigned a competence score of 0) if they did not show an
increase of reengagement behaviors during SF episodes. These
dichotomous variables were included in correlational analyses
within the SF task as well as in correlations with measures from
other tasks. A second independent coder, who was blind to the
experimental hypotheses, coded a random 30% of all infants and
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measures for reliability. Cohen’s Kappa for all measures was 0.74.
In regard to excluded children, the task was not administered to
n = 8 children, while n = 8 children had to be excluded due to
technical errors of the camera system and n = 6 children due to
crankiness and being fuzzy. An additional five children could not
be included in the smiling analyses because they did not display
any smiling behavior.
Social Mirroring Task
This task was adapted fromMeltzoff (1990). The main purpose of
this task was to test infants’ beginning self-awareness by assessing
if they show preference for an experimenter who mirrors their
own actions.
Two experimenters sat across the child at a table, while the
child was seated within the caretaker’s lap (120 cm away from
both experimenters). To make sure children would not develop
a preference for one of the experimenters, both experimenters
were interacting with the child for about 5–10 min before the
experiment started. At the beginning of the experiment, identical
toys were handed to both experimenters, as well as to the child
at the start of each trial. Each trial lasted for about 45 s. The
toys were a car (10 cm long  9 cm tall), a cup (6.5 cm
diameter  8.5 cm tall), a shovel (20 cm long  6 cm wide) and
a round form (12 cm diameter  4 cm tall). While the starting
object was counterbalanced across infants, in the following, the
object order remained the same: the car was always preceded
by the cup, the shovel was always preceded by the car, and the
formwould always follow the shovel independent of the respective
starting object. Note that this was done in order to avoid order
effects in this comprehensive longitudinal study. We predefined
children’s actions. The experimenter to the left always imitated
the infant’s actions. Correspondingly, the experimenter to the
right performed control actions. The predefined actions (control
actions in brackets) were as follows: Shake (Slide), Slide (Shake),
Pound (Poke), Poke (Pound), Mouth (Touch Body), Touch Body
(Mouth), Passive (Passive). It was made sure that experimenters
showed the same activity level, which according toMeltzoff (1990)
rules out that the infant prefers one of the experimenters because
of the way he or she manipulated the toy. Further, since children
might prefer the experimenter who acts temporally contingent
upon their own actions, both the imitating and the non-imitating
experimenter started and stopped acting at the same time as the
infant. The task was filmed and there were three target behaviors
which were then coded using the INTERACT® software. The
average duration of smiling and looking at either the imitating or
the non-imitating experimenter, as well as the number of instances
children showed testing behavior averaged across the four objects
were used as dependent variables. Thereby, in order to be coded
as smiling infants had to display raised cheeks and lips which
were turned upward. Testing behavior was defined as sudden and
unexpected actions (sudden stop and restart) on the toy while
eyeing the experimenter.
To build competence scores, first difference scores were
calculated by calculating the duration or number of times (in
the case of testing behavior) of a particular behavior which
was directed at the imitating experimenter minus the duration
or number of times the same behavior was directed at the
non-imitating experimenter. First, preferences score were created:
Any subject receiving a difference score larger than zero preferred
the imitating experimenter and therefore obtained the preference
value 1, while subjects who did not differentiate between both
experimenters obtained value 0. Subjects preferring experimenter
2 displayed more behavior toward experimenter 2 resulting in a
negative difference score. Those infants obtained the preference
value  1. Additionally, competence scores were established by
merging the preference value  1 and 0. Thus, if infants preferred
the non-imitating experimenter 2 or showed no preference for
either experimenter they were classified as incompetent and were
assigned a score of 0. In contrast, if infants preferred the imitating
experimenter they were classified as competent (score of 1). The
sum score of the competence scores in regard to all three behaviors
was used in analyses. Cohen’s Kappa for the competence scores of
all three behaviors ranged from 0.73 to 1.0.
In regard to excluded children, the task was not administered to
n= 6 infants due to time restrictions, while n= 6 infants had to be
excluded due to not showing sufficient interest in the objects and
n= 8 children due to technical problems with the camera system.
Mirror Self-recognition Task
The task was adapted from Asendorpf and Baudonniére (1993).
The main purpose of this task was to assess children’s growing
concept of self by testing if children recognize themselves in the
mirror.
Prior to testing, child and experimenter engaged in a warm-up
phase involving a mirror (dimensions: 110.5  104 cm), during
which the experimenter made sure the child fixated the mirror
for a minimum of three times and at least once for 2 s (baseline-
phase). Then, the parent approached the child to apply a mark
on either the child’s nose or cheek. This was done in a way to
ensure that the parent was not visible in the mirror for the child
or that the child and parent were not standing in front of the
mirror. The parent used a cloth with lipstick traces (invisible to
the child) andwiped the child’s nose thereby leaving amark on the
child’s nose or cheek. For none of the children this served as a clue
leading them to touch their face after the mark-application. This
application-phasewas followed by the test-phase duringwhich the
experimenter made sure to focus the child’s attention back on the
mirror (e.g., bymoving a puppet between the child and themirror)
so that the childwould look into themirror at least three times and
at least once for 2 s.
The task was filmed and the videos were analyzed using a
coding scheme adopted from the Mirror Behavior Checklist by
Amsterdam (1972) in both the baseline-phase and test-phase.
A child was coded as 1 (recognizer) if he or she touched the
mark [e.g., while verbally referring to either the mark, both the
mark and the self or to self (child’s name or I)]. If the mark-
touching behavior was not present, the child received a score of
0 (non-recognizer). Interrater-reliability for the recognizer/non-
recognizer coding was assessed by calculating Cohen’s Kappa and
was 0.92.
In regard to excluded children, the task was not administered in
n= 3 children due to time restrictions, while n= 5 children had to
be excluded because could not be brought to focus on the mirror;
n= 2 did not concentrate during the task and were distracted and
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n = 2 additional infants had to be excluded because of technical
problems with the camera system.
Delayed Self-recognition Task
This task was adapted from Povinelli et al. (1996). The main
purpose was to assess children’s understanding of the self as
possessing explicit temporal features. At the beginning of the
experiment the child and experimenter 1 sat across from each
other at a table surrounded by black walls to secure a high
contrast-video. Experimenter 2 sat at the child’s right to operate
a hand camera which stood ca. Two meters away from the child.
Further, a covered videomonitor within the child’s visual field, but
not yet visible to the child, was part of the setting. Themonitor had
a width of 39.5 cm and a height of 35 cm. Two cameras were used
to film the whole setting, as well as close-ups of the child during
the experiment.
At the beginning of themarking-phase, experimenter 2 showed
the camera to the child. The child was told that the child and
experimenter 1 would play a game and that the camera would
record everything so that they could look at the video later. Then,
experimenter 1 and the child began playing a search game lasting
for five trials, where the child had to search for a cracker which
could be hidden under three different opaque containers. Trials 1
and 2 were used to habituate the child to experimenter 2 touching
his or her forehead (this was done while praising the child for his
or her success at the search task). During trial 3 a sticker (a yellow
one was used for dark-haired children and a blue one was used
for blond-haired children) was placed at the child’s forehead. The
post-it stickers measured 76  76 mm. Trials 4 and 5 served as
control trials to ensure the child had not detected the sticker. In
these trials the child was only praised, but not touched.
The test-phase followed 2 min after trial 5 and experimenter
2 informed the child that they would now look at the video. It
was made sure that the overall setting remained the same in the
test-phase as compared to the marking-phase and that the child’s
face was not reflected in the monitor. The child was shown the
video beginning in trial 3 and 15 s after the start the first prompt
was given: “Who is this?,” while pointing at the child in the video.
If children gave no answer the prompt was repeated. After an
additional 15 s, experimenter 2 gave the second prompt and asked:
“What is this?,” while pointing at the sticker in the video. If the
child did not answer or answered incorrectly the experimenter
said: “This is a sticker!” followed by “Where is the sticker now?”
After 15 additional seconds the third prompt followed and the
experimenter said: “Can you find the sticker? Where it is now?”
Thereby, the word “now” was emphasized.
It was coded whether children took off the sticker or touched
it, as well as when this behavior occurred. Based on this, children
could receive scores ranging from 0 to 4. They received a score of
0 if they did not touch the sticker at all. They received a score of
1 if they touched it only after the third cue, a score of 2 if they
touched it after the second cue, a score of 3 if they touched it after
the first cue and a score of 4 if they touched it even before any cues
were given. Interrater-reliability for this coding was 0.79 (Cohen’s
Kappa).
In regard to excluded children, the task was not administered
in n = 3 children due to time restrictions, while n = 9 children
TABLE 1 | Overview of measurement points when particular tasks were
administered.
Still- Social Mirror Delayed Verbal
face mirroring self-recognition self-recognition IQ
9 months X
12 months X
24 months X
4 years X X
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the study variables.
N %/M SD Categories/
Range
SF effect mile 9 months 61 0 = 12/1 = 88 0.32 0/1
SF effect gaze 9 months 66 0 = 30/1 = 70 0.43 0/1
SF effect reengagement 9 months 66 0 = 21/1 = 79 0.41 0/1
Social mirroring 12 months 69 1.39 1.20 0–3
Mirror self-recognition 24 months 69 0 = 32/1 = 68 0.47 0/1
Delayed self-recognition 4 years 55 1.80 1.31 0–4
Verbal IQ 4 years 63 107.44 13.72 67–137
mo, months; SF, still-face.
detected the sticker during application and in n = 2 children the
sticker fell off during the play-back phase. Finally, n= 1 child did
not pay attention to the video at the critical time points.
WPPSI Verbal IQ Subtest
WPPSI verbal IQ subtest (Petermann, 2009). In order to control
for children’s general cognitive skills, at the fourth measurement
point, their verbal IQ was assessed and used as a control variable.
For this purpose two subtests of the German version of the
WPPSI (Petermann, 2009) verbal IQ scale were administered. The
procedure followed the test manual. While the subtest
Information measures children’s basic knowledge in regard to
a variety of topics, the subtest Similarities involves that children
display verbal reasoning skills and engage in concept formation.
First, raw scores were calculated which were transformed into
normalized scores for the respective age group. Since we used two
out of three subtests we arrived at the estimated Verbal IQ scores
by building a sum of the normalized values, subsequently dividing
it by two and finally, multiplying it by three. These steps followed
the standard procedure for calculating IQ estimates as proposed
in the test manual (Petermann, 2009). In n = 7 children the test
could not be administered due to concentration issues. SeeTable 1
for an overview of the measures.
Results
An overview of descriptive statistics of the study variables is
presented in Table 2. In preliminary analyses, in regard to
group differences based on gender, girls, on average, were
more advanced in their social mirroring skills at 12 months,
t(67) = 2.25, p = 0.03 [girls (n = 31):M = 1.74, SD = 1.09; boys
(n = 38): M = 1.11, SD = 1.23], and in their MSR at 24 months
of age, 2(1)= 9.11, p= 0.00; n= 69, [girls (n= 34): recognizers:
85%; non-recognizers: 15%; boys (n= 35): recognizers: 51%; non-
recognizers: 49%]. Further, girls showed more of a SF smile effect,
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TABLE 3 | Zero-order point-biserial correlations between the study variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SF effect smile 1
SF effect gaze 0.12#(60) 1
SF effect reengagement  0.18#(61)  0.18#(66) 1
Social mirroring 0.29*(47)  0.11(51) 0.08(51) 1
Mirror self-recognition 0.15(47) 0.29*#(50) 0.01(50) 0.09(51) 1
Delayed self-recognition 0.01(39)  0.03(43) 0.01(43) 0.36* 6=(39) 0.26+(49) 1
Verbal IQ 0.13(45)  0.05 (50) 0.33*(50)  0.066=(51)  0.03(54) 0.226=(48) 1
*p < 0.05; +p < 0.10 (two-sided significance level); #Phi-coefficients; 6=Pearson correlation; SF, still face.
2(1)= 4.22, p= 0.04; n= 61, [girls (n= 31): SF smile effect: 97%
yes, 3% no; boys (n= 30): 80% yes, 20% no].
In contrast, boys and girls did not differ significantly in their
SF gaze effect [2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00; n = 66], nor in their SF
reengagement effect, [2(1) = 1.45, p = 0.23; n = 66]. Further,
girls and boys did not differ significantly in regard to verbal IQ,
t(61) = 0.64, p = 0.52, as well as in regard to DSR skills at
50 months of age, t(53)= 1.50, p= 0.14.
To assess relations among the study variables, correlational
analyses were conducted with a two-tailed significance level. As
can be seen in Table 3 we found that interindividual differences
in social mirroring skills at 12 months of age were predicted by
interindividual differences in the SF smile effect at 9 months,
while in turn, interindividual differences in social mirroring at
12 months predicted interindividual differences in DSR at 4 years
of age. Further, interindividual differences in MSR at 24 months
and in DSR at 4 years were related.
To assess the influence of possiblemediators (gender and verbal
IQ), partial correlations were conducted.
The significant relation between children’s social mirroring
skills at 12 months and DSR at 4 years of age rpartial (36) = 0.32,
p= 0.048, remained significant when controlling for gender, while
the relation between MSR at 24 months and DSR at 4 years of
age remained marginally significant when controlling for gender;
rpartial (46) = 0.23, p = 0.05, as did the relation between the SF
smile effect and social mirroring at 12 months, rpartial (44)= 0.22,
p = 0.07.
In order to assess the influence of early social responsiveness
on children’s MSR, while also considering possible mediators,
in addition to correlational analyses, regression analyses were
conducted.
First, a binary-logistic regression analysis (inclusion method)
was performedwith the complete set of early social responsiveness
measures as theoretically important predictors. Further, based
on Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation model, we included all
possible mediator variables based on if they showed significant
or marginally significant correlations with the outcome into
the regression analysis. Thus, verbal IQ could be excluded as
a mediator variable since it proved to be unrelated to MSR at
24 months (see Table 3), while gender had to be included. The
overall model correctly predicted 76.5% of recognizers and non-
recognizers. Only the SF gaze effect proved to be an independent
predictor of MSR at 24 months (see Table 4).
In order to assess the respective importance of early social
responsiveness for children’s DSR, while also taking into
TABLE 4 | Binary-logistic regression predicting MSR at 24 months.
B Wald Odd’s ratio p
SF effect smile 0.842 0.363 2.321 0.547
SF effect gaze 2.266* 4.439 9.640 0.035
SF effect reengagement 0.614 0.246 1.847 0.620
Social mirroring 0.193 0.185 1.213 0.667
Gender 1.090 1.249 2.976 0.264
Constant value  2.502 1.309 0.082 0.253
*p < 0.05; SF, still-face; SF, still-face.
TABLE 5 | Regression analysis to predict delayed self-recognition at
4 years of age.
ß T R2 F-value
SF effect smile  0.24  1.43
SF effect gaze  0.06  0.35
SF effect reengagement  0.19  1.16
Social mirroring 0.43* 2.69
Mirror self-recognition 0.29^ 1.84
Verbal IQ 0.34* 2.12
0.303 2.32^
^p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; SF, still-face.
consideration possible mediators, a linear regression analysis
(inclusion method) was conducted with the complete set of
early social responsiveness measures as predictors. Based on
Baron and Kenny (1986), verbal IQ was included as a possible
mediator, while gender could be excluded. As is shown in Table 5,
the overall regression model, F(6, 32) = 2.32, p = 0.056, was
marginally significant and explained 30% of variance in children’s
DSR at 4 years of age. Looking at single predictors, interindividual
differences in social mirroring skills at 12 months were found to
significantly predict DSR at 4 years of age, beyond verbal IQ at
4 years as another significant predictor and MSR at 24 months as
a marginally significant predictor.
Discussion
This longitudinal study had two major aims: It explored the
conceptual coherence of the self as a construct, as well as the
specificity of the social origins of the self. It included precursor
abilities and measures of self-awareness from infancy through
toddlerhood to preschool age, as well as control measures. Most
importantly, the findings suggest quite specific developmental
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pathways. Using (cf., Rochat’s, 2003) terminology, one such
pathway appears to lead from infants’ gaze reaction to contingency
disruption at 9 months to self-“identification” at 24 months,
while the other leads from self-awareness in a social imitation
game at 12 months to self-“permanency” at 4 years of age. These
developmental pathways indicate a fairly long-term continuity of
social cognition in regard to self-understanding that is consistent
with the long-term continuity of social cognition in regard to
other-understanding as indicated by developmental pathways
from infants’ understanding of goals and intentions to their later
theory of mind (cf., Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al.,
2008; Thoermer et al., 2012). Further, interindividual differences
in regard to the identified self and in regard to the permanent
self proved to be moderately related, independently of gender or
verbal IQ. Thus, the self seems to develop as a multi-dimensional,
and at the same time, (moderately) coherent concept.
The findings provided some support for theories emphasizing
the role of social interaction in the development of a concept of
self (e.g., Moore, 2007; Rochat, 2009). Specifically, interindividual
differences in children’s responses to contingency disruption
at 9 months as indicated by their gaze predicted MSR, while
sensitivity toward social mirroring predicted DSR. This is
consistent with Rochat’s (2009) idea that children do not only
use reflecting surfaces of all kinds, but their social world as a
mirror. Thus, infants expect others to project their inner self
back at them, just like a real mirror would do. Note that this
expectation might have been rapidly formed during infants’ early
dyadic social interactions with their caregivers and might not be
entirely endogenous, since exogenous, parental factors have been
shown to impact children’s behavior during SF (e.g., Rosenblum
et al., 2002).
Further the results are consistent with cross-cultural findings
(e.f., Keller et al., 2005) showing that toddlers show earlier MSR-
skills if they are socialized in cultures with a distal parenting style
promoting attentiveness toward the human face. Note also that
the correlational link between gaze behavior during the SF task
andMSR found in this study supports theories proposing that the
development of domain-specific cognitive structures supports the
development of MSR-skills (e.g., Neisser, 1995). More specifically,
it was children’s sensitivity toward interruption as indicated by
gaze which predicted mark removal, while the arguably more
emotional-evaluative reactions during the SF task, such as smiling
and trying to re-engage the partner, were not related to mark
removal. It is possible that smiling and re-engagement would
be related to more emotional-evaluative reactions to the mirror
image (such as puzzlement or coy reactions). This is a task for
future research, since those behaviors are expected to develop
well before mark removal. For instance, Reddy (2003) proposes
an affective-engagement account claiming that the experience of
self as an object to others as reflected in affective responses or coy
reactions (i.e., smile with gaze and/or head aversion), occurs at a
very early age, around 2 months. Links between the SF situation
and these measures in the mirror situation need to be explored in
future research involving younger age groups.
Again in favor of specific rather than more general
developmental links and in favor of the self being a multi-
dimensional construct, our data showed that while predicting
DSR, social mirroring in infancy did not predict MSR. Consistent
with our findings, a study in 9-to-18-month olds by Agnetta
and Rochat (2004), using a modification of Meltzoff ’s social
mirroring task, also did not find significant predictive relations
between social mirroring and MSR. Thus, while these skills may
emerge around the same age (Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2004) and
while interindividual differences may be concurrently related,
especially later in development (Asendorpf and Baudonniére,
1993), social mirroring skills toward the end of the first year of
life do not seem to be predictive of MSR. However, they seem to
predict DSR. There are several possible explanations for these
differential relations.
Nielsen and Dissanayake (2004) explained the missing
link between MSR and synchronic imitation skills found in
their own research referring to Perner’s (1991) developmental
theory. They argue that while secondary representations can be
applied in one field of development (e.g., featural information),
children might not be able to apply them in another field of
development (e.g., temporal information). This interpretation
implies domain-specific, rather than domain-general pathways of
self-development and is thus empirically supported by the results
of this study showing very specific relations. During the SF task, as
well as during the mirror rouge test children have to use featural
information to detect contingency. Consistently, the MSR and
the SF gaze effect in this study were also related. In contrast, as
is argued by Meltzoff (1990) in social mirroring contingency
detection based on the infant’s understanding that an interaction
partner behaves “like me” rather than on featural information as
inMSR is assessed. InDSR, children have to use featural, as well as
temporal cues to represent a temporally-extended self. Consistent
with this interpretation, bothMSR and social mirroring predicted
DSR. Further, another explanation would be that social imitation
gets increasingly complex and with increasing age it is supposed
to signify a higher level of mental state understanding and higher
meta-cognitive skills. More specifically, while the early detection
of “being imitated” in Meltzoff ’s task may be based on mere
surface detection of temporal contingency with increasing age it
might reflect infants’ intention understanding (Tomasello, 1995;
Striano and Rochat, 1999). Thus, the infant, who understands that
the interaction partner systematically matches his intended acts,
will thereupon attribute the intention to behave “like me” to the
imitating partner. Similarly, Agnetta and Rochat (2004) argued
that while at 9 months the discrimination of an imitating adult is
based primarily on the detection of contingency and a sense of
self-agency, toward the end of the first of year of life it is based
on intention understanding. Thus, social mirroring at 12 months
is likely to already reflect higher cognitive processes. Consistent
with this interpretation, social mirroring skills predicted DSR as
the cognitively more demanding measure of self-awareness.
While experimental research needs to identify the underlying
cognitivemechanisms of the developmental links identified in this
study, it seems plausible that children’s underlying metacognitive
awareness of being intentionally imitated as is the case in the
social mirroring task at 12 months and their metacognitive
awareness of having experienced what can be seen on the video
at 4 years of age, may be the source for the developmental link
between the tasks. Longitudinal research, using metacognition
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as an outcome measure, could shed light on that interpretation.
Finally, while the present longitudinal study only started at the
age of 9 months, theories of self-development have viewed the
first few months of life as particularly important. For instance,
children’s awareness of their own body as an object and its
relations to other objects has been conceptualized as a unique
part of self-awareness (e.g., Brownell et al., 2007; Moore et al.,
2007). Rochat (2009) proposed that it is from the second month
of age that infants engage in reciprocal exchanges and thereby
begin to objectify themselves as objects of shared attention.
Already at the age of 6 weeks, according to Rochat (2003), the
“situated self ” is established, a sense of how one’s own body
is situated in relation to other entities in the environment.
Therefore, to further complement the picture, future longitudinal
research on developmental precursors of MSR and DSR should
include measures of social responsiveness in the first months
of life.
The present longitudinal study supports the notion that MSR
seems to develop earlier than the permanent self which involves
the understanding that the self is invariant over time (Povinelli
et al., 1996; Suddendorf, 1999). Importantly, since identification
of themirror image is tied to the temporal simultaneity of the body
and itsmirror reflection, future research needs to shed light on the
exact nature of the capacities underlying the ability to recognize
one’s own mirror image. Interestingly, while related to different
precursor abilities, MSR and DSR were found to be moderately
developmentally related to each other, indicating conceptual
continuity. This result is in support of Rochat (2003) theory of self-
development. Rochat compares the self to an onion with different
layers. Thus, the self as a whole always comprises earlier and later-
developing stages. More specifically, one possible developmental
mechanism linking MSR and DSR proposed by Gallup (1998;
cited in Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2004) is that during MSR
children need to engage in introspection in order to focus on
themselves and to become the object of their own attention.
Thus, self-recognizers possess higher introspection skills than
non-recognizers. Subsequently, if applying introspection across
a variety of contexts during development, combined with meta-
representational abilities, introspection should not only promote
children’s time-restricted self, but also their temporally extended
sense of self.
A limitation of this study is that it did not include a
socially or culturally diverse sample. Cross-cultural research
comparing cultures with distal and proximal parenting styles,
as well as research in clinical samples need to corroborate the
developmental links identified in this study. Are deficits in social
responsiveness and imitation skills (e.g., in autistic children)
related to decreased MSR- and DSR-skills?
In sum, the present longitudinal findings show that infants
make use of their social world to form an understanding of
who they are. This seems to result in very specific, rather than
general developmental links between early social responsiveness
and children’s later understanding of self. To further explore
these specific developmental pathways more longitudinal work,
focusing on interindividual differences, is clearly needed.
Note that the same developmental links identified in self-
development might also be found when studying children’s
early understanding of others (cf., Moore and Corkum, 1994).
Similarly, on the neural level, there seems to be a shared,
while not completely overlapping, representation network for
self and other (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). Thus, future
studies should look simultaneously at the development of self
and other. In sum, the present findings suggest that one of
the multi-faceted interrelations between self-understanding and
other-understanding originates from infants’ understanding of
the other’s intention to “act likeme”which seems to lay the ground
for an advanced concept of the temporally extended self.
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